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Low-income people have less access to opportunitiesfor post-secondary
education, and the welfare reform in 1996 further limited access for welfare recipients. Since welfare reform, there has been an increasing interest in strategies meant to enhance the well-being of low-income people
through education and the development of human capital. In this study,
we examine how low-income people saved for post-secondaryeducation in
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) in a nationwide demonstration.
IDAs provide matches for savings used primarily for home purchase,
microenterprise,and post-secondary education. We examine how savings
outcomes differed between participantswho intended to use their savings
for post-secondary education and other participants.We also look at how
these differences in savings outcomes were associated with difference in
participantcharacteristicsand in IDA design acrossdifferent programsin
the demonstration.
Results indicate that the savings outcomes of "education savers" were
different from other participants.Furthermore,savingsfor post-secondary
education moderated some relationships between savings outcomes and
other characteristicsof participantsand of IDA programs.Implicationsare
discussed for policy and social-work practicefor using IDAs to promote
human-capitaldevelopment by low-income people.
Keywords: post-secondaryeducation,individual development accounts,
assets building, welfare reform
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Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that education
has a wide variety of positive economic and social effects on
individuals, families and society as a whole (Becker, 1993; Beverly
& Sherraden, 1997; Center for Women Policy Studies, 2002). Furthermore, the labor-market returns to education have increased
since the early 1970s (Mishel, Bernstein & Schmitt, 1997; Mishel &
Burtless, 1995), and the rise in earnings inequality during the past
two decades is closely related to differences in educational attainment (Amott, 1994; Bernhardt & Dresser, 2002). In the meantime,
despite the fact that the average level of education has increased
over the years for both men and women, low-income people
and other disadvantaged groups have faced decreasing access to
opportunities for post-secondary education (Mortenson, 2000).
Among the many factors contributing to low access is inadequate financial resources (Boldt, 2000; Gittell, Gross, & Holdaway,
1993). In particular, the increasing costs of college and cuts in
need-based financial aid have made post-secondary education
less affordable for many low-income people (Choitz & Widom,
2003; Mortenson, 2000; Sherraden, 1991). The welfare reform of
1996 has focused on work requirements, further limiting access
to post-secondary education for welfare recipients. Low-income
people may need to put short-term needs ahead of investment in
their long-term development of human capital, and it is important
for social policy to help them save and invest for their future
education.
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are an approach to
help low-income people save and accumulate financial assets for
post-secondary education. IDAs are targeted to low-income people and provide incentives and an institutional structure conductive to saving (Schreiner, et al., 2001). IDAs provide participants
with matches for savings used for home purchase, microenterprise, and post-secondary education. This paper investigates the
following questions: Do IDA participants who intend to use their
savings for post-secondary education have different savings outcomes than other IDA participants? And if so, what demographic
factors and program-design characteristics are associated with the
differences? Answers to these questions may provide lessons that
will help guide modifications to IDA policy and program design
in ways that might improve savings outcomes for those intending
to use their IDA for post-secondary education.
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Background
Access to Post-Secondary Educationfor Low-Income People
The rising costs of college since the early 1980s have made
post-secondary education less affordable for low-income households (Milano, 2003). Social investment in higher education for
low-income people has also declined. Since the 1990s, the federal government and some states have moved from need-based
financial aid to merit-based aid (Clancy, Cramer, & Parrish, 2005;
Mortenson, 2000). In addition, the federal government has aggressively expanded educational loan programs in the past two
decades, with more of the costs of these programs borne by borrowers instead of taxpayers. Unfortunately, students from lowincome families are more likely to view loans as barriers; for
example, many low-income students report being afraid of not
being able to to pay back the loans (Choitz & Widom, 2003).
Furthermore, state budget crises in recent years have forced many
community colleges-traditionally a popular choice among lowincome students-to raise tuition (Choitz & Widom, 2003).
These above factors made college less affordable for lowincome people, especially considering that college aid previously
had greater impact for the poor than for the non-poor (Dynarski,
2002). Related to these changes, gaps in educational attainment
by income level started to widen in the 1980s and 1990s. For
example, by the mid-1990s, a student from a family in the top
income quartile was 10 to 12 times more likely than a student
from the bottom quartile to have completed a bachelor's degree
by age 24, but in 1970 and 1980, the gaps were only 6 and 4 times
(Mortenson, 2000).
Beyond these changes to college costs and the structure of
financial aid, welfare reform made post-secondary educationespecially four-year college degrees-more difficult for lowincome people. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) replaced Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) block grant (U.S. Congress, 1996).
This law transformed the 60-year-old welfare system into a workbased system which requires states to place increasing percentages of adults in work or work-related activities. Historically,
most work-relief programs until the first half of this century
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did not offer extensive opportunities for training and manpower
development of welfare recipients, primarily to avoid opposition
from trade unions (Charnow, 1943). Since the 1960s, however,
a few training and manpower development programs such as
the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) program,
the Work Incentive program (WIN), the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program and the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) programs were implemented with federal
funding. The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS)
program, which was the centerpiece of the Family Support Act
(FSA) of 1998, permitted the states to support postsecondary
education, including two- and four-year college degrees.
TANF's work-participation mandates have shifted the focus
of welfare-to-work programs away from education and training
toward quick job placement. The new system of welfare provision
includes a number of regulations that discourage welfare recipients from pursuing post-secondary education. First, TANF is
designed to place recipients directly into jobs. States are penalized
unless they put a large share of their adult recipients into work
programs. This makes states less likely to provide education or
meaningful job training. Second, job programs under TANF are
narrowly defined, and most post-secondary education and job
training do not count as "work" .For example, recipients enrolled
in post-secondary education for longer than a 12-month period
are, for the most part, excluded from a state's calculation of its
work-participation rates (Greenberg, Strawn, & Plimpton, 1999).
Third, recipients are limited to 60 months of benefits (whether or
not consecutive), and states can specify shorter time limits. Poor
women with children and limited resources often take longer
than four or five years to finish a Bachelor's degree (Mathur,
1998; Naples, 1998). Fourth, no more than 20 percent of caseload
can count vocational training toward meeting the work requirement, including teen parents in secondary school. This cap may
further limit the number of those seeking to enroll in higher
education.
These factors can greatly reduce welfare recipients' access
to post-secondary education, especially 4-year college degrees.
Studies show that in the last few years, the college attendance
of welfare recipients has decreased (Center for Women Policy
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Studies, 2002; Jacobs & Winslow, 2003; Jones-Deweever, Peterson, & Song, 2003). For example, the Center for Women Policy
Studies found that the college enrollment of welfare recipients
had dropped by 46%, 60%, and 77% in different states such as
Wisconsin, New York, and California. Other studies have also
noted a drop in the number of students in universities who receive
welfare (Snow, 1997; Spatz, 1997).
The "quick labor-force attachment model" assumes that those
who take low-paying or part-time jobs will eventually move up
to higher-paying and full-time jobs (Pavetti & Acs, 2001). While
welfare reform has decreased welfare caseloads, research has
consistently found that those who leave TANF often have unstable jobs and face precarious financial circumstances (Anderson
& Gryzlak, 2002; Johnson & Corcoran, 2003; Loprest, 2001). At
the same time, studies have found that welfare recipients who
had college degrees earned more than those without college degrees (Karier, 1998; Mathur, 2004). This research has sparked an
increasing interest in human-capital development strategies to
enhance long-term self-sufficiency among welfare recipients, and
more broadly, among the working poor (Strawn, 2004). Individual
Development Accounts are one approach in this respect.
Asset-based Theory, IDAs, and Post-Secondary Education
Asset-based welfare theory highlights the importance of assets compared to that of income (Sherraden, 1991). According to
this perspective, assets bring security, and maybe more importantly, assets may possibly stimulate and facilitate the development of human capital. Consistent with the notion of social investment in developmentalism (Midgley,2003; Sen, 1999), asset-based
welfare theory emphasizes opportunities to build assets that can
strengthen human capacities.
Based on this theory, IDAs were designed to help low-income
people build assets for long-term development, including postsecondary education (Sherraden, 1988; 1991). Deposits are made
in IDAs by low-income participants. Others could also make deposits, perhaps related to milestones such as completing a year of
schooling or graduating from high school. Withdrawals for postsecondary education (or other specified asset purchases) would
be matched, with higher match rates for poorer participants. In
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contrast to the current emphasis on loans to pay for college, IDAs
aim to promote a system of savings and assets.
At the state level, asset building and IDAs are already a policy theme. For example, PRWORA allows states to set up IDA
programs with TANF funds and to exclude IDAs balances as
countable assets for the purpose of qualifying for benefits. As of
2002, 22 states include post-secondary education as a matchable
use of their IDAs (Edwards & Gunn, 2002). Some IDA or similar
programs outside the United States have also focused on postsecondary education (Boshara & Sherraden, 2004). For example,
Canada has embarked on an asset-building demonstration (called
"Learn$ave") that provides matches for post-secondary education and microenterprise. In Western Europe, national Individual
Learning Accounts (ILAs) resemble IDAs for post-secondary education. Participants in the Saving Gateway, a pilot asset-building
program in the United Kingdom, indicated that education and
training were the only restrictions on matched withdrawals that
they would find acceptable (Kempson, McKay, & Collard, 2003).
In sum, matched savings for post-secondary education as a new
policy theme is being tested both in the United States and elsewhere.
Purpose of the Study
Can low-income people save for post-secondary education
in IDAs? How do their savings outcomes differ from those of
participants who are saving for other purposes such as home ownership or microenterprise? Given the current development of IDA
programs, these are important questions. This study addresses
these questions through an analysis of data from the American
Dream Demonstration (ADD), a national IDA project. As far
as we know, this is the first quantitative research on how lowincome people save for post-secondary education in a structured,
matched savings program.
Data and Methods
ADD Programs
ADD was a national demonstration of IDAs for low-income
people. The 14 IDA programs in ADD were run from 1997-2001 by
13 not-for-profit host organizations (one host had two programs)
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which include community development organizations, socialservice agencies, credit unions, and housing organizations. A consortium of private foundations provided funding. All programs
in ADD provided matches for home purchase, microenterprises,
and post-secondary education, and some programs also provided matches for job training, home repair, or retirement savings.
Match rates ranged from 1:1 to 7:1, with the most common rate
being 2:1. Eight programs had annual deposit limits, ranging from
$180 to $3,000 per year; and six programs had lifetime deposit
limits, ranging from $1,800 to $ 8,000 per participant.
The savings data are unusually accurate, as they come directly from the monthly passbook savings-account records of the
depository institutions.
Participants
ADD programs used a variety ways to market IDAs, and
ADD participation was voluntary. Enrollment in ADD began July
1, 1997 and ended by December 31, 1999. As of December 31,
2001 (the date at which deposits were ended), ADD had 2,353
participants. A participantis defined as an enrollee with at least
one account statement, whether or not he or she later dropped out
(Schreiner, Clancy & Sherraden, 2002). Important characteristics
of ADD participants are presented in Table 1. Most participants
were female (80 percent), and nearly half were African-American
(47 percent). Almost half were never-married (49 percent). About
58 percent had attended some college or had some type of college
degree, and 82 percent were employed (full-time or part-time)
at enrollment. Compared with the general low-income population (Sherraden et al., 2000), ADD participants were more educated and more likely to be employed. On the other hand,
compared with the general low-income population, a higher proportion of ADD participants were women, African-American,
or never-married. These comparisons suggest that ADD participants tended to be somewhat disadvantaged members of the
"working poor".
Measurements
The dependent variable in this study, Average Monthly Net
Deposits (AMND), is defined as deposits plus interest minus unmatched withdrawals, divided by the number of months eligible
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to participate. Withdrawals in ADD may be matched or unmatched, depending on whether they are used to purchase matchable assets, such as home, postsecondary education, or microenterprises. AMND measures net deposits but also controls for the
length of time that a participant has had the opportunity to save.
All else constant, greater AMND implies greater saving and asset
accumulation in IDAs.
The independent variables include important programrelated factors (also known as "institutional" factors) and participant characteristics. Program factors include the match rate,
the monthly savings target, hours of required financial education,
and whether participants used direct deposit into their IDAs.
The monthly savings target is the total match cap (i.e., the limit
on the amount of deposits that can be matched) divided by the
time cap (i.e., the number of months after opening an account
in which a participant may make matchable deposits). IDAs in
ADD have both a match cap and a time cap because funds are
limited in time and amount. If deposited each month and not removed as an unmatched withdrawal, this level of savings would
lead to net deposits equal to the lifetime match cap by the end
of participation. Participant characteristics include demographic
information (gender, age, marital status, race/ethnicity, number
of children, and number of adults), education and employment
status, household income, bank account ownership, home ownership, and receipt of AFDC/TANE Detailed information on these
variables is presented in Table 1.
The regression also includes a yes/no variable that indicates
whether a given participant was an "education saver" who made
a matched withdrawal for post-secondary education or who declared at enrollment that he or she intended to make such a
matched withdrawal. There are two major reasons that we include
participants who have not made matched withdrawals as "education savers". First, for most participants, savings ended and
matches were allowed only for deposits made through December
31, 2001, at which point the most recent data are available. However, matched withdrawals were possible at most ADD programs
through June 30, 2002. Therefore, the "time window" for the
current data does not catch participants who made a matched
withdrawal after the end of the "savings period" (i.e., December
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31, 2001). This group includes a large share of intended "education savers". Second, further analyses indicate that there are
no significant differences between "intended education savers"
and "actual education savers" in terms of their demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics.
Similar yes/no indicator variables are also included to mark
participants who declared an intention to save for home purchase,
home repair, microenterprise, retirement saving, or job training.
Finally, in order to examine how being an education saver moderates the associations between program and participant factors
and savings outcomes, the regression model includes interaction
terms between the indicator for "education savers" and all the
other independent variables.
Analysis
Following descriptive and bivariate analyses, multiple regression was used to examine how Average Monthly Net Deposits
in IDAs might differ between "education savers" and others in
ADD. AMND was regressed on program factors, participant characteristics, and interactions between the indicator for "education
savers" and each of the other independent variables. After listwise deletion of cases with missing values, the regression sample
encompassed 1,979 cases. This model simultaneously estimates
how the savings outcome is associated with program and participant factors, with being an "education saver", and how being an
"education saver" moderates the associations between AMND
and other program and participant characteristics. Specifically,
the coefficient on the (non-interacted) indicator for "education
savers" is an estimate of the link between characteristics that are
omitted from the regression that are associated with both "education savers" and AMND. The interaction effects provide estimates
of how being an "education saver" moderates the associations
between AMND and program and participant characteristics.
Overall, the model intends to examine both whether "education
savers" are different from other savers and, if they are different,
why.
Researchers often attempt to assess moderating or interaction
effects indirectly through subgroup analysis (Coulton & Chow,
1992). The "sub-group" approach runs two regressions, one with
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only "education savers" and one with all others. The "interaction"
model used here is to be preferred over the "sub-group" approach,
mostly because there is no rigorous way to compare coefficients
between two different regressions because the sample sizes and
error terms differ (Coulton & Chow, 1992; Koeske, 1992). The
coefficients across the regressions might look similar or different,
but there is no straightforward way to test whether the apparent
differences/similarities are statistically significant. With the "interaction" model used here, in contrast, the p-value on a given
coefficient of the interaction term immediately and transparently
indicates whether being an "education saver" moderates that
characteristic, and an F test for all the interaction terms as a group
(along with the stand-alone "education saver" indicator) can be
used to see whether "education savers" differ overall from other
participants.
Results
Sample Characteristics
There were 377 "education savers" in ADD. Of these, 40 percent had made matched withdrawals as of the cut-off date of the
data, accounting for 21 percent of all the ADD participants who
had made matched withdrawals at that point. Table 1 compares
the characteristics of "education savers" and other participants.
Compared with others, "education savers" were younger, more
likely to be never-married, and had fewer children at home. They
were also less likely to be females and less likely to be AfricanAmerican. "Education savers" also had less income, were less
likely to be working full-time, and-in line with the discussion in
the literature review-were less likely to receive welfare. These
features are also consistent with the fact that a larger share (22%)
of "education savers" was already students when they opened
their IDAs than other savers (6%).
BivariateAnalysis of Savings Outcomes
Table 2 presents the bivariate analysis of AMND by some subgroups of program and participant characteristics. When other
factors were not controlled, male participants, married participants, and participants with higher educational status had higher
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Characteristicsof ADD Participantsand Comparisons of Education
Savers and Non-Education Savers

Variables
Continuous Variables
Age
Number of adults
Number of children
Household monthly
income
CategoricalVariables
Gender
Female
Male
Race/ethnicity
White
African-American
Others
Marital Status
Never married
Divorced, Separated,
or Widowed
Married
Education
Did not Complete
High School
Completed High
School or GED
Some College
Education (no
Bachelor's Degree)
Completed 4-year
Degree or More
Employment
Employed Full-time
Employed Part-time

Comparisonsof
NonEducation education Educationand
Non-education
Savers
Savers
Savers
(N = 377) (N = 1,976)
t I x2
Mean
Mean
-11.3***
37
30
0.68
1.4
1.5
1.8
-3.36**
1.5
-3.80***
$1,402
$1,252
Percents

ADD
Participants
(N = 2,353)
Mean
36
1.5
1.7
$1,378
Percents

Percents

8.37**

2.77
26.4***
22.9***
52.18***
24.81***
15

23

10.59**

20

15

5.96*

20

27

6.82**

53

51

0.36

0.04

56.43***
7.56***
continued
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Table 1
Continued
Comparisonsof
NonADD
Education education Education and
Non-education Participants
Savers
Savers
(N = 2,353)

Variables

(N = 377) (N = 1,976)

CategoricalVariables
Employment
Not working or
Unemployed
Students
Banked
Home Owner
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Formerly
Currently

Percents

Percents

t I x2

Percents

9

10

0.75

10

22
75
14

6
77
16

100.01***
0.55
1.39

8
77

30
7

39
11

11.0***
3.26

38
10

Savers

*p < .10, **p < .05; ***p < .01.

AMND. Participants who received welfare, those who did not
have home or bank account ownership, and African-American
participants saved less. The mean value of AMND of education
savers ($19.8) and that of other savers ($18.4) was not different
from each other in bivariate analysis. Among program factors,
participants with higher match rates saved less, and those who
used direct deposits saved more.
Regression Analysis of Savings Outcomes
Table 3 displays the results from the regression analysis on
AMND. The model as a whole was statistically significant (p
= 0.01) and explained about 22 percent of the variance in the
dependent variable.
Effects of program and participantfactors. Three of the four program factors were positively related to AMND. Participants who
had higher monthly savings target and those who used direct
deposit saved more. Hours of financial education was also positively linked with AMND. These findings suggest that these three
institutional incentives facilitate participants' savings in IDAs.
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Table 2
BivariateAnalyses: AMND by Subgroups

AMND ($)

Analysis of
Variance
(Fvales) /
t test (t value)

InstitutionalCharacteristics
Match Rate
1:1
2:1
3:1
4:1 to 7:1
Use of Direct Deposit to IDAs
Yes
No
ParticipantCharacteristics
Gender
Female
Male
Race/Ethnicity
Caucasian
African-American
Others
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Divorced, separated or widowed
Education
No High School Diploma
High School Graduates
Some College, Less than Bachelor's Degree
Bachelor's Degree or More
Employment
Unemployed or not working
Employed, full-time
Employed, part-time
Students, working or not working
Home Owner
Yes
No

F = 7.15***

t = 3.44***

t = -2.73***

F = 51.4***

F

=

30.1***

F

=

20.2***

F =2.54

28.4

16.5

t = 7.68***

continued
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Table 2
Continued
Analysis of
Variance
(F vales) /
AMND ($) t test (t value)
Checking or Savings Account
Yes
No
Receipt of Public Assistance
TANF or AFDC Never
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF or AFDC currently
Intended Users of Education
Yes
No

20.9
10.1

t

20
17.6
11.1

F = 14.2***

19.8
18.1

t =1.20

=

10.63***

*p!<.10, **p <.05; ***p <.01.

Higher match rates, however, were negatively associated with
AMND. Specifically, participants with match rates 4:1 to 7:1 saved
less than those who had match rates ranging from 1:1 to 3:1. The
study by Schreiner (2004) of all ADD participants found similar
results, i.e., match rates was associated with less AMND.
There are a couple of possible explanations for the negative
links between match rates and savings in IDAs. First, programs
may assign higher match rates if they expect their participants
to save less. In this case, cause-and-effect is reversed, and (expectations of) low savings lead to higher match rates. Second,
because IDA participants are saving for a specific purpose, and
they generally have limited incomes, some participants could be
"target savers". In other words, they may aim to save a fixed
amount and stop saving more (for example, they may aim to
save $2,000 for tuition, or to save $1,500 for the down payment
of a house). For these participants, a higher match rate allows
them to reach a given asset-accumulation target with less savings
(Schreiner, 2004).
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Table 3
Regression Analysis on Average Monthly Net Deposits (AMND)

InstitutionalCharacteristics
Match Rate
(4:1 to 7:1)
1:1
2:1
3:1
Monthly Savings Target
Use of Direct Deposit to IDAs
Hours of General Financial
Education
ParticipantCharacteristics
Age
Female
Race/Ethnicity
(Caucasian)
African-American
Others
Marital Status
(Never Married)
Married
Divorced, separated or
widowed
Number of children
Number of adults
Education
(No High School Diploma)
High School Graduates
Some College, Less than
Bachelor's Degree
Bachelor's Degree or More
Employment
(Unemployed or not working)
Employed, full-time
Employed, part-time
Students, working or not
working

Main Effects

Interaction Effects

Coefficient p-value

Coefficient p-value

7.76***
6.94***
9.67***
0.18***
3.95*
0.49***

0.003
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.08
0.001

5.19
10.17
13.06*
0.08
6.69
0.71***

0.49
0.15
0.08
0.21
0.35
0.003

0.16**
2.56*

0.01
0.09

-0.06
-9.05**

0.72
0.01

-7.87***
1.68

0.001
0.33

3.50
6.23

0.29
0.11

1.86
0.19

0.30
0.89

-11.88**
-0.75

0.02
0.85

-0.64
2.33**

0.12
0.01

1.11
-0.85

0.91
2.92*

0.62
0.09

-1.07
3.75

0.83
0.41

8.96***

0.001

8.96

0.19

-1.90
0.04
1.11

0.34
0.98
0.70

0.26
2.46
10.14*

0.96
0.65
0.09
continued
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Table 3
Continued
Main Effects

Household Monthly Income
Home Owner
Having Checking or Savings
Account
Receipt of Public Assistance
(TANF or AFDC Never)
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF or AFDC currently
Intended users of education
Intended users of home
purchase
Intended users of home repair
Intended users of
microenterprises
Intended users of retirement
Intended users of job training
F
R2

N

Interaction Effects

Coefficient

p-value Coefficient

p-value

0.003***
3.72**
5.27***

0.003
0.04
0.001

0.003
7.89*
-2.94

0.25
0.07
0.41

-2.02
-0.14
-10.41
5.88

0.13
0.95
0.55
0.65

4.95
-6.30

0.17
0.27

-

-

12.83
6.92

0.32
0.59

-

-

10.33
5.14

0.43
0.70

-

-

-

9.71
0.22
1,979

*p!<.10, **p:<.05; ***p:<.01.

Four demographic characteristics of participants were related
to AMND: age, gender, race/ethnicity, and number of adults.
Contrary to the findings from bivariate analysis, female participants saved more than male participants. In other words,
once other factors associated with being a woman (such as being
African-American, being single, having kids, etc.) were taken into
consideration, it turns out that being female per se is associated
with higher savings. Older participants and those having more
adults in households had higher AMND. When other factors in
the regression constant, AMND was higher for Caucasians than
for African Americans.
Among participants' socioeconomic characteristics, IDA sav-
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ings were higher for those who attended some college or who
had a degree. Also, participants with higher household monthly
incomes saved more. This association, however, was not strong; a
$1 increase in monthly income was associated with about $0.003
more AMND. Home owners and bank-account owners also saved
more than participants without such assets.
Savings for post-secondary education. Analyses show that variables related to "education savers" (the stand-alone indicator and
the interaction terms) explained about 2 percent of the variance in
AMND. As a group, the variables related to "education savers"
were statistically significant (p < 0.05) (based on the method of
Pedhazur, 1997, p. 109), suggesting that savings outcomes were
indeed different for "educational savers".
What factors were related to the differences? Table 3 indicates
that being an "education saver" moderated the associations of
several program and participant factors on AMND. Among program factors, the interaction with hours of education was positive
and statistically significant. While an additional hour of financial
education was linked with $0.49 more AMND for any participant,
regardless of whether they were an "education saver", an additional hour was associated with an additional $0.71 for "education
savers". Apparently, "education savers" derived greater benefits
from financial education than did others. Thus, an additional hour
of financial education was associated with $1.20 ($0.49 plus $0.71)
more AMND for "education savers" but only $0.49 more AMND
for others.
The interaction of education savers and match rates was negative and statistically significant. The education savers with a
match rate of 3:1 saved much more than those with match rates
between 4:1 and 7:1. Perhaps "education savers" are more likely
than others to be "target savers" (targeting, for example, to save
for tuition) for whom higher matches rates are associated with
dampened savings.
Among participant demographic factors, savings for postsecondary education moderated the association of gender with
AMND. While females in ADD on average saved $2.56 more than
males, female "education savers" saved $9.05 less than female
"non-education savers" and $6.49 ($9.05-$2.56) less than male

156

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

participants. Thus, while women saved more than men overall
after controlling for other factors, female saved less than the
average male participant for "education savers".
Similarly, although married participants on the whole in ADD
had higher AMND than not-married participants (p-value of
0.30), married "education savers" saved $11.88 less than married
"non-education savers" and $10.02 ($11.08-1.86) less than nonmarried participants. Married participants and female participants who planned to use their IDAs for post-secondary education saved much less than others.
What might explain this? In order to further understand how
gender and marital status jointly affect savings, we did some additional analyses. Because these two variables appear in multiple
places in the regression model with interactions (see Table 3),
evaluating how they affect AMND is not straightforward. Thus,
we computed the differences of AMND between the sample when
every participant was assumed a single man, a single woman, a
married man, or a married woman. Here is the specific method
for the calculation: in a case when everyone was assumed to be a
single man, we set female=0 and married=0 in the equation model
derived from the regression model. The same method was used
under three other assumptions. The results from these analyses
indicate that single men saved the most for their postsecondary
education, followed by single women and married men, and married women saved the least among the four groups. Therefore, it
seems that women, especially married women, face more barriers
to save for postsecondary education.
Turning to the interactions with participant socioeconomic
factors, home owners who were "education savers" saved $7.89
more than home owners who were not "education savers" and
$11.61 ($7.89 + $3.72) more than renters. It appears that home
ownership may probably help with saving, especially for postsecondary education. Perhaps unsurprisingly, students who were
"education savers" saved $10.14 more than did students with different asset-accumulation goals. Perhaps the immediate saliency
of the use of IDAs helped students save for post-secondary education. Or perhaps students shifted existing savings or financial
aid into IDAs to take advantage of the match. In any case, it is
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clear that, among "education savers", students saved more than
non-students.
Discussion and Implications
Discussion
We underscore several findings. First, being an "education
saver" seems to strengthen the associations of some program factors with savings performance. For example, "education savers"
seemed to benefit more from financial education than did others,
perhaps because a higher percentage of education savers were
students. Being a student might signal a greater motivation to
learn and perhaps also better learning skills inasmuch as students
are used to classroom learning and homework. The negative association between match rates and IDA savings was also stronger
among "education savers". The ADD data cannot reveal the reason for this, but it may be that "education savers" are also more
likely to be "target savers" (targeting, for example, tuition).
Second, being an "education saver" also moderates the relationship between several participant characteristics and AMND.
Female "education savers" saved much less than other female
savers. Why did female "education savers" save less? Probably
these women may face unique obstacles (for example, the need
for child care) in their pursuit of post-secondary education. If they
realize that they face these obstacles only after enrolling in IDAs
and declaring their intent to save for post-secondary education,
then this may explain their lower savings. Of course, another
possible reason is that TANF rules act as limits on the access of
welfare recipients to higher education, and low-income women
with children are those most likely to be affected by TANF oreven if they are not currently on welfare-those who expect to
possibly be affected by TANF rules in the future (Hurst & Ziliak,
2001).
Married "education savers" also saved much less than other
married participants. Perhaps married participants who planned
for post-secondary education found that going to school (or going
back to school) was more difficult than single participants. For
example, married participants may face responsibilities (for example, child care) or barriers within the household (for example,
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unsupportive spouses) that unmarried men or women do not
have. Our analysis further indicates that married women may
especially face these or other related barriers.
"Education savers" who were students saved more than "education savers" who were not students. More than half of "education savers" either had some college education (38%) or already
had a college degree (22%). Perhaps the pressures of paying for
their education make saving for post-secondary education more
salient for student savers. They do not have to think very far into
the future to see how IDAs will be useful. In contrast, participants
who are not already students are saving for a further-off goal and
thus may end up savings less.
As a caveat on the interpretation of these results, we note
that participants in ADD were both program-selected and selfselected. Therefore, ADD participants are not representative of
the general low-income population. We cannot address selfselection into participation through ADD data. Thus, the results
in this paper pertain to a particular portion of low-income population and must be tentative.
Implications
Implicationsfor college savings plans. As mentioned, lack of financial resources has been a major barrier for low-income people to
attend college. Many new forms of financial aid in recent years
have been created to subsidize savings for postsecondary education (for example, Coverdell Education Savings, HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime Learning, and State College Savings Plans or
"529 savings plans"), but these policies provide their subsidizes
through tax breaks that are most irrelevant to low-income people
(Clancy, Cramer, & Parrish, 2005). The findings of our study
indicate that low-income people (especially some segments of
low-income people) saved for postsecondary education in ADD.
Thus, it may be helpful to include more low-income people in the
college-finance toolkit.
For example, teaming IDAs with 529 plans may be one strategy to promote more inclusive IDAs for post-secondary education
(Clancy, 2003; Clancy & Sherraden, 2003). One of the main features
of 529 plans is that participation is not restricted by income, but
is available to all. After-tax contributions to 529 plans accumulate
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tax-free and are not taxed upon withdrawal if used for expenses
for post-secondary education. All states but one sponsor 529
plans, and some states (Rhode Island, Michigan, and Louisiana)
encourage savings by low-income households through matching provisions (Clancy, 2003). Given that 529 plans are run by
government and that the government is a potential source of
match funds, linking IDAs and 529 plans could help include more
low-income households in subsidized savings policies aimed at
post-secondary education. Some scholars indicate that 529 plans
may carry significant risk for low-income families due to its
high investment fees, penalties for non-educational uses, and
possible negative interactions with college aid (Clancy, Orszag,
& Sherraden, 2004). These concerns may need to be taken into
consideration for the partnership of IDAs with 529 plans.
Implications for IDA designs. Our findings indicate that savings
outcomes were different for "education savers" and that being an
"education saver" moderated the associations of some other program and participant factors. These findings may help programs
design IDAs that could improve savings outcomes for "education
savers". These results may also help understand what segments
of participants benefited most from IDAs. We highlight several
findings and their implications below.
We found that financial education was associated with greater
savings for "education savers" than for others, probably because
most of the education savers were already students and thus were
better at being students than are non-students. This may imply
that financial education in IDAs is not appropriate for adults and
other non-students. Adopting the principle of adult education
more completely in financial education of IDA programs may
help address this concern (Hogarth & Swanson, 1995). The adult
education principles in financial education highlight the importance of understanding learners' (especially low-income learners)
life context and experiences and bringing them into the teaching
and learning process.
We also found that certain groups of low-income people
had better savings outcomes for post-secondary education. First,
students saved better for post-secondary education than nonstudents. This may indicate that salient goals help savings. IDA
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programs may be able to encourage greater savings outcomes
by helping to make savings goals salient, for example by roleplaying the act of making an asset purchase. This may also suggest
that participants who were already students benefited more from
IDAs to save for post-secondary education than other participants
possibly because these students were already "on track".
Second, it appears that being married and/or being a woman
had more obstacles to save for their post-secondary education in
IDAs. These findings may indicate that savings for post-secondary
education probably are not very relevant for some participants.
Due to household or resource related constrains, some participants were not able to save successfully for their college education. Thus, IDA program designs may need to be adjusted to
accommodate needs of different segments of participants based
on their specific life circumstances (Schreiner & Sherraden, forthcoming). For example, IDA programs may be able to increase
their relevance to some participants by expanding the types of
matched uses, such as job training, vehicle purchase, or child
care, and these uses might provide more practical and immediate
benefits to some portions of the low-income population (Edin,
2001). Programs with a different model maybe more appropriate
for the post-secondary education of some groups (such as nonstudents, married women) of low-income people.
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